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Antitrust
by Michael Eric Ross*
and
Jeffrey S. Cashdan**
In 1998 the Eleventh Circuit published eight antitrust opinions.1
Some of these cases turned on procedural issues; some were decided on
the merits. As in previous years, defendants generally were successful,
but not always. Each of these decisions is briefly summarized below.
Southern Card & Novelty, Inc. v. Lawson Mardon Label, Inc.2

concerned the legality of a "full-line forcing" arrangement.' Defendant,
Lawson Mardon Label, Inc. ("Lawson"), manufactured postcards, which
it sold to distributors throughout North America for resale to retail
outlets, which in turn sold them to consumers. Lawson manufactured
"local view" postcards depicting nonlicensed local images (for example,
in Florida, pictures of beaches or alligators). Lawson also manufactured
postcards bearing copyrighted images of Walt Disney Company
characters pursuant to what effectively was an exclusive license.4 There
* Partner in the firm of King & Spalding, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Florida (A.B.,
1971); Harvard University (J.D., 1974). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of King & Spalding, Atlanta, Georgia. Claremont McKenna
College (B.A., 1987); University of Chicago (J.D., 1990). Member, State Bars of Georgia
and Illinois.
The views expressed in this Article are the personal opinions of the authors and do not
necessarily represent the views of King & Spalding or any of its clients.
1. Johnson v. University Health Servs., 161 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 1998); Tuscaloosa v.
Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548 (11th Cir. 1998); Aquatherm Indus. v. Florida Power
& Light Co., 145 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 1998); Southern Card & Novelty, Inc. v. Lawson
Mardon Label, Inc., 138 F.3d 869 (11th Cir. 1998); Bankers Ins. Co. v. Florida Residential
Property & Cas. Joint Underwriting Ass'n, 137 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 1998); All Care
Nursing Serv. v. High Tech Staffing Servs., 135 F.3d 740 (11th Cir. 1998); Technical
Resource Servs. v. Dornier Medical Sys., 134 F.2d 1458 (11th Cir. 1998); Colsa Corp. v.
Martin Marietta Servs., 133 F.3d 853 (11th Cir. 1998).
2. 138 F.3d 869 (11th Cir. 1998).
3. Id. at 875.
4. Id. at 871. Although Lawson's license with Disney is nonexclusive, Disney has not
granted similar rights to any other postcard manufacturer. Id.
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were at least six other postcard manufacturers that produced postcards
specific to areas in Florida.5 Plaintiff, Southern Card & Novelty, Inc.
("Southern Card"), was a Daytona Beach, Florida based business that
distributed postcards to retailers in central and northern Florida.
Southern Card distributed postcards manufactured by Lawson as well
as other postcard manufacturers.'
In late 1991, Lawson introduced the "Disney Product Plan," which
required Southern Card to purchase the same dollar amount of "local
view" postcards that it purchased of Disney postcards. To prevent loss
of its lone source of Disney postcards, Southern Card began buying
Lawson's "local view" postcards in compliance with Lawson's new
program. Eventually, Lawson requested that Southern Card buy all of
its postcards from Lawson, a request that Southern Card refused.
Thereafter, Lawson began recruiting other postcard distributors to
distribute its products in competition with Southern Card. Lawson also
limited Southern Card's purchase of Disney postcards.'
Upset by this turn of events, Southern Card sued Lawson, claiming
federal and state antitrust violations based on: (1) alleged unlawful tying
of Disney and "local view" postcards; and (2) monopolization and
attempted monopolization of the greater Orlando area "market" for "local
view postcards."8 On defendant's motion for summary judgment, the
district court dismissed plaintiff's claims.9 In particular, the district
court held that plaintiff's antitrust claims were not per se unlawful and
that, applying the rule of reason, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that
Lawson had unreasonably restrained competition in the "local view"
postcard market.' °
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, explaining that the challenged
practice-embodied in Lawson's "Disney Product Plan"-was a "line
forcing" arrangement." In a line forcing arrangement, a manufacturer
compels its dealers to offer for sale some ("representative line forcing")
or all ("full line forcing") of the manufacturer's line of products. 2
Generally, such arrangements do not bar the dealer from selling
competing product lines, and in such cases these vertical, nonprice

5. Id. at 872.
6. Id.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id.
Id. at 873.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 875.
Id.
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restrictions generally pass antitrust muster.13
Moreover, as the
Eleventh Circuit correctly observed, line forcing arrangements typically
do not foreclose choice by an ultimate consumer, and thus, per se
illegality treatment is unwarranted. 4
Applying the rule of reason, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that
plaintiff's claims could not survive summary judgment." The court
rejected as "woefully deficient" Southern Card's proffered affidavit of one
of Lawson's competitors designed to show market foreclosure because the
affidavit failed to provide even the most basic information necessary to
truly evaluate the impact of Lawson's line forcing on its competitors'
access to the alleged relevant market."
The court likewise rejected
Southern Card's expert testimony that consumers were paying higher
prices due to Lawson's conduct because the survey on which such
testimony was based suffered from "biased" sampling and the failure to
take local market factors into account, such as cost of living. 7 Southern Card's proffered evidence was insufficient to prove an antitrust claim
under the rule of reason and, therefore, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the grant of summary judgment.'"
Bankers Insurance Co. v. Florida Residential Property & Casualty
Joint UnderwritingAss'n 9 presented the Eleventh Circuit with another
opportunity to address the state action doctrine. Once again, the issue
before the court related to the definition of a "political subdivision" for
purposes of state action immunity.20 Specifically, Bankers Insurance
Co. concerned Florida's reaction to the state's post-Hurricane Andrew
insurance crisis. 2 1 Pursuant to state law, all Florida residentialproperty insurers were required to form an association to write
"involuntary" insurance for citizens who could not obtain coverage in the

13. See, e.g., Famous Brands, Inc. v. David Sherman Corp., 814 F.2d 517, 523-24 (8th
Cir. 1987).
14. Southern Card & Novelty, 138 F.3d at 875. Line forcing arrangements thus differ
from tying arrangements for which per se illegality is sometimes warranted. See Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). Courts have used principles of tying
law to evaluate full-line forcing arrangements. See, e.g., Unijax, Inc. v. Champion Intl,
Inc., 683 F.2d 678, 684-85 (2d Cir. 1982); Pitchford Scientific Instruments Corp. v. PEPI,
Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir. 1976).
15. 138 F.3d at 876.
16. Id. at 876-77.
17. Id. at 877.
18. Id. at 878.
19. 137 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 1998).
20. Id. at 1296. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 44 (1985). See
generally Michael Eric Ross & Jeffrey S. Cashdan, Antitrust, 48 MERCER L. REv. 1389,
1390-91 (1997).
21. 137 F.3d at 1294.
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"voluntary" insurance market.22 After the association implemented
competitive bidding for contracts to service policies written by the
association, one of the unsuccessful bidders sued the association and four
individuals who worked for it claiming that the association's bid process
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.23 The district court granted
defendants' judgment on the pleadings based on the state immunity
doctrine of Parker v. Brown24 and the intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine of Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Thbe Co.2"
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.26 Regarding the Copperweld issue,
the court ruled that the individual defendants were agents of the
association and, thus, had an alignment of interests such that the
"plurality of persons" needed for a section 1 claim was missing. 27 The
court recognized this issue was "more difficult" for the association itself,
but it declined to reach the issue because of its state action immunity
holding.28
As for the state action issue, the court held that the association had
sufficient "government-like attributes" and "public-entity trappings" to
be treated as a political subdivision. 29 Among other things, the court
observed that the association was subject to Florida's open records
("sunshine") laws, had certain tax exemptions, and operated under a
plan approved by the Department of Insurance. 0 Moreover, although
the association's members were private, competing insurers, the court
noted that these members did not compete in the "involuntary"
insurance market and, in fact, such members participated in the
association only because the law required them to do so."' Because the
association is a political subdivision, and the court found the association
to have acted pursuant to a clearly articulated legislative policy
held
permitting it to select its contracting parties as it saw fit, the court
32
the association's conduct to be immune from antitrust liability.
Colsa Corp. v. Martin Marietta Services, Inc.33 affirmed the Eleventh
Circuit's prior pronouncement that the Sherman Act is not a panacea for

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 1294-95.
Id. at 1295.
317 U.S. 341 (1943).
467 U.S. 752 (1984).
137 F.3d at 1298.
Id. at 1295-96.
Id. at 1296.
Id. at 1296-97.

30. Id. at 1297.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1298.
33.

133 F.3d 853 (11th Cir. 1998).
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all alleged business wrongs.3 ' In Colsa plaintiff sued Martin Marietta
under section 2 of the Sherman Act for allegedly seeking to create or
maintain a monopoly. Colsa's claim arose from Martin Marietta's
termination of Colsa's subcontract for services in connection with a
government contract awarded to Martin Marietta. The district court
granted Martin Marietta summary judgment on the ground that Colsa
failed to properly define the relevant market. 35
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.36 Rather than relying on the failure
to prove a relevant market, however, the court focused on a more fundamental deficiency-the lack of any alleged anticompetitive conduct.37
The Eleventh Circuit observed that "Colsa cannot claim that Martin
Marietta monopolized-or attempted to monopolize-its own contract by
terminating a subcontract."38 The Eleventh Circuit correctly determined that Colsa's claims, if any, sounded in contract rather than
antitrust law. 9
Johnson v. University Health Services, Inc.4' related to another
offbeat antitrust claim. Plaintiff, Dr. Johnson, asserted a variety of
claims, including claims under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,
arising out of a hospital's alleged promise to provide Dr. Johnson with
financial assistance to start her own practice.4' Plaintiff's antitrust
claims boiled down to the assertion that defendant hospital was
somehow obligated to subsidize her practice and its failure to do so
harmed competition.42 The district court granted defendant's summary
judgment on all counts, including the antitrust counts.'
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed." The court held that Dr. Johnson's
claimed injuries were not the type of harms that the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent and, thus, plaintiff lacked antitrust injury.' The
better approach would have been to hold that Dr. Johnson's claim failed
to state a cause of action under the antitrust laws because the alleged
injury did not, and could not, involve harm to competition and consum-

34.

Seagood Trading Corp. v. Jerrico, Inc., 924 F.2d 1555, 1573 (11th Cir. 1991)

(citation omitted).
35. Colsa Corp., 133 F.3d at 855-56.
36. Id. at 856.
37. Id. at 855-56.
38. Id. at 856.
39. Id.
40. 161 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 1998).
41. Id. at 1336-37.
42. Id. at 1337.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1338.
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ers generally, as opposed to mere injury to Dr. Johnson. 46 Regardless,
the outcome was manifestly correct.
Three years ago, Aquatherm Industries-a manufacturer of solarpowered heating systems for swimming pools-convinced the Eleventh
Circuit to reject Florida Power & Light's res judicata defense and to
allow Aquatherm to proceed with its federal antitrust claim. 47 On its
second trip to the Eleventh Circuit, Aquatherm Industries,Inc. v. Florida
Power & Light Co.,45 plaintiff had less success.49 Aquatherm claimed
that defendant Florida Power & Light ("FPL)-the exclusive provider
of electric power for approximately two-thirds of Florida-violated
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by promoting, through direct
mailing and advertising, the use of electric pool-heating pumps as an
economical way to heat residential swimming pools.5 ° FPL did not sell
pool-heating pumps or any other swimming pool equipment.5 ' According to Aquatherm, FPL's conduct violated the antitrust laws because, by
such conduct, FPL either (1) "wrongly attempted to prevent erosion of its
own electric power monopoly or (2) wrongly interfered with the poolheater market in order to increase its profits."52 The district court
granted FPL's Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss the antitrust counts for
53
failure to state a claim.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.54 First, the court addressed the
section 2 claims.5 5 The court explained that the alleged conduct in the
two proffered relevant markets-the alleged market for sale of electric
power and the alleged market for sale of pool heaters-did not support
a claim in this case. Regarding the former, the court noted the absence
of any allegation that FPL's actions increased its market share or
56
erected any kind of barrier to entry into the electric power market.
Regarding the latter, the court observed the lack of any allegation that
FPL held or attempted to create a monopoly in the pool-heater market-indeed, FPL did not even compete in this alleged market.5 7 With

46. See Levine v. Central Fla. Med. Affiliates, 72 F.3d 1538, 1545 (11th Cir. 1996)
(declining to reach standing issue because of lack of meritorious antitrust claim).
47. Aquatherm Indus. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 84 F.3d 1388 (11th Cir. 1996).
48. 145 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 1998).
49. Id. at 1260.

50. Id.
51.
52.
53.
1997).
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id. at 1261.
Aquatherm Indus. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 971 F. Supp. 1419 (M.D. Fla.
145 F.3d at 1260.
Id. at 1260-61.
Id. at 1261.
Id.
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no allegation of any other relevant market improperly monopolized by
FPL or in which FPL's conduct raised a "dangerous probability" of
achieving a monopoly, the court held that Aquatherm's monopolization
and attempted monopolization claims were doomed.58
Aquatherm's conspiracy to monopolize and monopoly leveraging claims
met a similar fate. 9 The conspiracy claim suffered from several
defects. First, the court held that plaintiff's conspiracy allegations were
vague and conclusory.6 ° The complaint lacked facts supporting the
general suggestion of a conspiracy between FPL and manufacturers and
suppliers of electric pool-heat pumps. 1 Second, the court explained
that FPL's alleged desire to "increase its sales" or "increase its market
share" merely described "normal business goals," and such allegations
failed to support a claim of specific intent to achieve a monopoly in a
relevant market, as required to support a conspiracy to monopolize
claim.62 Finally, the court discounted Aquatherm's claim that FPL
conspired to monopolize the pool-heater market because "no authority
exists holding [that] a defendant can conspire to monopolize a market in
which it does not compete."' For that same reason, the court rejected
plaintiff's section 2 monopoly leveraging claim, observing that FPL did
not seek any competitive advantage in the alleged pool-heating market
because it did not compete in such market."
Aquatherm's section 1 claims met with equal skepticism-and
rightfully so.65 The court rejected Aquatherm's basic conspiracy to
restrain trade claim because of the lack of any alleged harm to
competition." The court explained that Aquatherm's charge that FPL
acted unfairly by disseminating false information, to the detriment of
Aquatherm, was insufficient to support a section 1 claim without
allegations of harm to competition generally." For this basic reason,
plaintiff's tying and group boycott claims also failed to state a claim.'
Accordingly,
the court affirmed the dismissal of Aquatherm's com69
plaint.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id. at 1261-62.
Id. at 1261.
Id.
Id. at 1261-62.
Id. at 1262 n.4.
Id. at 1262.

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1262-63.

68. Id.
69. Id. at 1264.
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In Technical Resource Services v. Dornier Medical Systems, *° the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed two jury verdicts rejecting plaintiff's claim
that defendant restrained trade and monopolized or attempted to
monopolize the market for servicing lithotripter machinery (machines
that use shock waves to destroy kidney stones without invasive
surgery). 1 According to plaintiff, defendant refused to provide it with
replacement parts, diagnostic software, and service manuals, and
defendant allegedly tied the purchase of the lithotripter machinery to
the purchase of unwanted service contracts, all in an effort to control the
aftermarket for servicing lithotripter machinery.72 Ultimately, two
juries rejected the core elements of each of plaintiff's claims-although
some confusion surrounded the juries' answers to the special interrogatories."3 The district court entered judgment for defendant, and the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed.74 The case on appeal largely turned on
interpretation of the jury's answers to the special interrogatories, which
the court held reasonably and fairly could be harmonized to support the
judgment.75
76
All Care Nursing Service, Inc. v. High Tech Staffing Services, Inc.
concerned an alleged per se unlawful price fixing arrangment and group
boycott. In response to a severe nursing shortage in southern Florida in
the mid-1980s and quality control problems with the nursing services
provided, the South Florida Hospital Association ("SFHA") enlisted
twelve hospitals in Palm Beach County to set up a "Preferred Provider
Program" ("PPP"). Under this program, the hospitals solicited bids from
temporary nursing agencies for selection as preferred providers.
Selection criteria included competence, services provided, quality, and
bid prices. All participating hospitals agreed to seek nurses from
preferred providers before considering nonpreferred agencies. Each
hospital was free to decide with which of the preferred agencies it would
contract, and the hospitals did not agree to a uniform price or a price
range for such services.77
All nursing agencies were invited to participate in the bidding.
Sixteen did so, and eight of them were selected as preferred providers.
The hospitals began operating under the PPP in November 1988,

70. 134 F.3d 1458 (11th Cir. 1998). One of the authors represented a defendant in a
related section 1 action brought by Technical Resource Services, Inc.
71. Id. at 1460.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1461.
74. Id. at 1462.
75. Id. at 1464-67.
76. 135 F.3d 740 (11th Cir. 1998).
77. Id. at 744.
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entering into individual contracts with each of the preferred providers
at their separate bid prices. The agencies agreed to other conditions in
these contracts, such as treating their nurses as employees in order to
shift some of the cost burden associated with independent contractors to
the agencies. While the contracts were for one-year terms, each agency
could terminate its contract with a particular hospital upon thirty-days
notice, thus providing a mechanism to account for market changes.78
Several nonpreferred nursing care providers, some of whom submitted
failed bids, filed suit against the participating hospitals, the SFHA, and
the preferred agencies claiming violations of sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act and their Florida counterparts.79 In essence, these claims
asserted that the formation and operation of the PPP constituted a per
se unlawful' price fixing arrangement and a group boycott.8 0 After a
four-week jury trial, a verdict was entered in favor of defendants on all
claims, and the district court
rejected plaintiffs' posttrial motions for
8
judgment as a matter of law. '
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 2 The antitrust issue on appeal
turned on whether the PPP was per se unlawful, for the Eleventh
Circuit made it clear that if the rule of reason applied, it would defer to
the jury's determination that plaintiffs had failed to prove a relevant
market.8 3 First, the court considered whether the PPP constituted per
se unlawful price fixing. 4 The court laudably focused its inquiry on
objective evidence of price fixing, rather than intent evidence. 8 While
the PPP has some impact on price, the court noted that there was no
direct price agreement among the competing hospitals or among the
preferred agencies, and that the preferred agency agreements allowed
agencies on thirty-days notice to terminate their contract if they thought
conditions warranted re-entry to the market.8 6 In other words, the PPP
contracts had an escape clause that allowed the market to dictate price.

78. Id.
79. Id. In response, defendants filed RICO claims against plaintiff All Care Nursing
Id. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed a jury verdict for
defendants on the RICO claims. Id. at 745.
80. Id. at 745-46.
Services, Inc. and its operator.

81.

Early in the case, plaintiffs sought to preliminarily enjoin the implementation of

the PPP. The district court granted the injunction, but the Eleventh Circuit vacated it
because of the lack of an evidentiary hearing. All Care Nursing Serv. v. Bethesda
Memorial Hosp., Inc., 887 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1989). The request for an injunction was
never reinstated.
82. 135 F.3d at 749.
83. Id. at 747 n.12, 749.
84. Id. at 747.
85.

Id. ("anticompetitive effects--not intent-is the focal point of antitrust legislation").

86. Id. at 744.
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The court explained that the "key to per se treatment is whether the
conduct is of the kind that can only be anticompetitive," and it concluded
that the PPP could not be labelled that way. 7 Accordingly, the court
refused to condemn the PPP as a per se unlawful price fixing arrangement. 88
The court likewise refused to label the PPP a per se unlawful group
boycott.8 9 Again, the court properly was guided by consideration of
whether the PPP was the type of practice "which history has shown [has]
only anticompetitive effects."90 The court reasoned that the PPP did
not constitute any refusal to deal at all, much less a group boycott.9'
All agencies were able to participate in the bidding to become preferred
providers and the hospitals remained able and willing to deal with
nonpreferred agencies if the preferred agencies did not meet their
needs. 2 Moreover, the evidence showed that other medical facilities
relied upon the services of the nursing agencies, thus ensuring that
competition thrived among the preferred and nonpreferred agencies.93
Therefore, the court declined to condemn the PPP as unlawful per se. 94
The jury found that no relevant market was shown (a threshold step to
prove a violation based on the rule of reason), and because that finding
was not clearly erroneous, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the jury's
verdict against plaintiffs.9"
In Thscaloosa v. Harcros Chemicals, Inc.,9 thirty-nine Alabama
municipal entities brought an antitrust suit against five chemical
companies and distributors for allegedly conspiring to fix prices for
repackaged chlorine used for the treatment of drinking water, sewage,
and swimming pools.97 Defendants allegedly submitted sealed bids for
government contracts in various parts of Alabama based on prearranged
"list prices," thereby allocating the repackaged chlorine contracts as they
wished. The Alabama municipalities charged violations of sections 1 and
2 of the Sherman Act, as well as violations of Alabama's equivalent of

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 748.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

92. Id. (noting that the nonpreferred agencies had received more than a "trifling" of
nursing business from hospitals even after operation of the PPP).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 749.

95. Id.
96. 158 F.3d 548 (11th Cir. 1998).
97. Id. at 553. Repackaged chlorine is liquid chlorine stored in containers for delivery
to, and use by, chlorine consumers. Id.
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section 1 and a state fraud claim.9" Following discovery, the district
court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment.99 Crucial to
this decision by the district court was its exclusion of certain evidence
as hearsay and exclusion of much of plaintiffs' expert testimony. 1°°
Plaintiffs appealed the district court's evidentiary and summary
judgment rulings.'0 '
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, on the
whole granting a victory for the plaintiffs. 10 2 First, the Eleventh
Circuit reinstated much of the excluded lay and expert testimony,
including testimony regarding an alleged admission by the late chairman
of one of the defendants (Jones Chemicals) that the company fixed
chlorine prices in the Southeast, and testimony by plaintiffs' experts
concerning pricing behavior, defendants'
costs, and contract incumbency
03
rates in the relevant markets.
The court then considered whether the record supported plaintiffs'
antitrust claims.'
As to defendant Jones Chemicals, the testimony
concerning its former chairman's alleged admission was enough by itself,
"[in the absence of overwhelming evidence to the contrary," to warrant
a trial.'0 5 As to two other defendants, the court held that it was
irrational to assume they participated in any conspiracy because they
had garnered "zero or near-zero market share" from the alleged
enterprise.'
With no other evidence linking these defendants to the
alleged conspiracy, the court affirmed summary judgment for them. 10 7
As to the remaining defendants, the court stated that the documentary
evidence, by itself, was insufficient to withstand summary judgment
because such evidence at best was in "equipoise," and thus would be
insufficient to meet plaintiffs' burden of proof. 8 The improperly
excluded expert testimony, however, tipped the balance towards
plaintiffs.' °9 Plaintiffs' experts presented evidence of price parallelism-that is, interdependent pricing by defendants that uniformly rose

98.
99.
1532-38
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 554-55.
Id. at 555-56. See Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 1504, 1521-24,
(N.D. Ala. 1995).
158 F.3d at 556-57.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 557-67.
Id. at 569.

105. Id. at 568.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id. at 568-69.
Id. at 569.
Id.
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and fell during the relevant period. ° Such conscious parallelism, by
itself, is insufficient to prove an antitrust conspiracy. 1 ' So-called
"plus factors"-such as proof that the defendants, if acting unilaterally,
would be acting contrary to their economic self-interest--are necessary
to ensure "that unilateral or procompetitive conduct is not punished or
deterred."" 2 Here, however, the court observed a "plus factor,"
extremely high contract incumbency rates that the court thought were
too high to be explained by chance or innocent conduct alone." 3 As
the court explained:
[tihe odds that [defendants] could achieve a price and profit increase
and maintain incredibly high incumbency rates-that is, maintain the
very same distribution of municipal contracts year after year-are
minuscule ... unless the oligopolists were communicating with one

another. In sum, this combination of high profits and high incumbency
would not be likely to occur if the defendants either were vigorously
competing with each other or were engaging in competitive price
leadership.""
Accordingly, the court reversed summary judgment for the remaining
defendants and remanded the case for trial. "5
CONCLUSION
None of the antitrust opinions published by the Eleventh Circuit this
year forged a new path in the law. Rather, these opinions applied rather
mundane procedural or substantive antitrust principles, and many
turned on rules of evidence. This is not meant as a criticism. Rather,
it is a welcome sign that antitrust jurisprudence in the Eleventh Circuit
is continuing its recent mainstream approach. This down-the-middle
jurisprudence will aid competition and consumers by providing
businesses reliable law to guide their practices and by further deterring
meritless actions that clog the courts and waste valuable resources.

110.
111.
1991).
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 571-72.
Id. See Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1456 n.30 (11th Cir.
158 F.3d at 571-72.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 577-73.
Id. at 573.

